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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY SUFFERED DURING COFFEE BREAK AS 
Aru:SING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-Plaintiff was employed 
by defendant laundry company as a mangle operator. A collective bargain-
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ing agreement between the defendant and the union representing its em-
ployees provided for two paid ten minute rest periods during the work day. 
Plaintiff left the defendant's premises during such a rest period and went 
to a nearby restaurant. On her return she slipped on ice on defendant's 
front step and was injured." The Department of Labor and Industry found 
the injury compensable under the Michigan Workmen's Compensation 
Act.1 On appeal, held, reversed, two justices dissenting. The place of the 
injury is not determinative of eligibility for compensation. Because de-
fendant had no control over plaintiff's actions and because plaintiff was 
not actively engaged in rendering a service to defendant at the time of the 
accident, the injury did not arise out of and in the course of plaintiff's 
employment. Salmon v. Bagley Laundry Co., 344 Mich. 471, 74 N.W. (2d) 
1 (1955). 
The majority of courts have recognized that an employee remains "in 
the course of" his employment when he is engaged in ministering to his 
personal health, comfort and necessities,2 unless he acts in an independent 
and reckless manner or in conflict with specific instructions.3 This rule 
is predicated either upon the theory that these are acts that a workman may 
reasonably do while employed4 or upon the basis that they are of indirect 
benefit to the employer.5 Although these theories are generally extended 
to include injuries occurring during rest periods, lunch periods, and coffee 
breaks,6 the majority of the court in the principal case refuses to accept 
this application, basing their argument on the fact that the defendant 
did not have the right to control the workmen during the rest period be-
cause, during that time, they were free to leave his premises.7 The "right 
to control" test has often been used to determine whether the employer-
employee relationship exists,8 but not in determining whether the act arises 
1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §411.1 et seq. 
2 Zurich General Accident &: Liability Ins. Co. v. Brunson, (9th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 
906; Haller v. Lansing, 195 Mich. 753, 162 N.W. 335 (1917). See 7 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION, perm. ed., §1617 (1950). 
3 Monahan v. Hoage, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 419; Young v. Department of Labor 
&: Industries, 200 Wash. 138, 93 P. (2d) 337 (1939); 7 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION, perm. ed., §1617 (1950). 
4 Haller v. Lansing, note 2 supra. 
5 Thomas v. Proctor &: Gamble Mfg. Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 P. 372 (1919); Mann v. 
Board of Education, 266 Mich. 271, 253 N.W. 294 (1934). 
6 Sundine's Case, 218 Mass. 1, 105 N.E. 433 (1914); Zurich General Accident &: Lia-
bility Ins. Co. v. Brunson, note 2 supra; Kubera's Case, 320 Mass. 419, 69 N.E. (2d) 673 
(1946); Sullivan's Estate v. Motor Realty Corp., 272 App. Div. 986, 73 N.Y.S. (2d) 276 
(1947); Biagi v. United States, (D.C. Cal. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 697. 7 SCHNEIDER, WoRKMEN's 
CoMPENSATION, perm. ed., §1632 (1950); 16 NACCA L. J. 88 (1955). 
7 Principal case at 474. 
8 The majority cites Tuttle v. Embury-Martin Co., 192 Mich. 385, 158 N.W. 875 (1916); 
Dennis v. Sinclair Lumber &: Fuel Co., 242 Mich. 89, 218 N.W. 781 (1928); and Janofski v. 
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in the course of the employment. The dissenting opinion of Justice Smith 
points out that adoption of such a test is a judicially instigated reversion 
to the very common law tests of liability which the workmen's compensation 
acts sought to eliminate.9 The effect is to cut the working day into " ... 
a checkerboard of legal relationships."10 Such a test loses its usefulness 
once it is decided that the employer-employee relationship exists, for it 
would exclude many injuries heretofore assumed to be compensable.11 
The majority of the court implies that in order for the injury to be com-
pensable an employee must be "actively" engaged in a service to his em-
ployer when the injury occurs. While many courts do require a finding 
of some benefit to the employer,12 the rule in the principal case would 
apparently require the employee, when injured, to be actually producing 
for his employer in order for the injury to arise in the course of his em-
ployment. Justice Smith rejects any test of benefit, relying on Haller v. 
Lansing,13 and adopting the theory that any act that a workman may rea-
sonably do while employed " ... as part of the on-the-job activities of the 
human being involved ... " is in the course of his employment.14 Any test 
of benefit smacks of a requirement of consideration passing from employee 
to employer. Surely such common law tests should be atiolished when ad-
ministering an act aimed at compensation, not damages.15 The language 
of the dissenting opinion is broad enough to allow recovery wherever the 
injury occurs. Perhaps the requirement that an injury must arise "out of" 
as well as "in the course of" the employment to be compensable is a suffi-
cient limitation upon such a suggestion.16 Many courts require the find-
ing of " ... a causal connection between the conditions under which the 
work is required to be performed and the resulting injury" to substantiate 
a finding that the injury arose out of the employment.17 The modern trend 
is to allow compensation when the nature, conditions, obligations, or inci-
dents of employment create a zone of special danger out of which the injury 
Federal Land Bank, 302 Mich. 124, 4 N.W. (2d) 492 (1942), all of which adopt the "right 
to control" test merely to determine whether the injured party was an independent 
contractor or an employee. 
9 Principal case at 482-486. 
10 Id. at 485. 
11 Theoretically, under the majority's view, an injury suffered by an employee while 
getting a drink of water would not be compensable, because the employer does not have 
the right to control such acts. 
12 Note 5 supra. 
1s 195 Mich. 753, 162 N.W. 335 (1917). 
14 Principal case at 490. 
15 O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 71 S.Ct. 470 (1951); Hebert 
v. Ford Motor Co., 285 Mich. 607 at 610, 281 N.W. 374 (1938). 
16 See McNicols Case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913). 
17 Id. at 499; Daniel v. Murray Corp. of America, 326 Mich. I, 39 N.W. (2d) 229 (1949). 
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arose.18 In the context of lunch hour and rest period injuries most courts 
recognize a distinction between injuries occurring on or- off the premises 
of the employer,19 only the former being compensable as arising out of the 
employment.20 The distinction is based on the fact that once an employee 
leaves his employer's premises, unless at the latter's direction,21 an injury 
does not occur because of a hazard of the employment.22 The rationale is 
not that the employer may control the employee on his premises, but that he 
has control over the premises and the duty to keep them in a reasonably safe 
condition.23 Since the injury in the principal case occurred on the steps 
of the employer's premises most courts would hold the injury compensable.24 
This result could be reached either on the theory that injuries on the 
premises of the employer during rest periods are compensable, or on the 
theory that plaintiff was returning to work just as she would in the morn-
ing or after lunch.25 A 1954 amendment to the Michigan act provides that 
every employee going to or from work while on the premises of his employer 
18 Thom v. Sinclair, [1917] A.C. 127; Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E. (2d) 328 
(1940); O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., note 15 supra. 
19 Some extend compensable injuries beyond the premises of the employer. See, e.g.: 
Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co., 225 Ala. 462, 143 S. 813 (1932); Kasari v. Industrial Com-
mission, 125 Ohio St. 410, 181 N.E. 809 (1932); 82 A.L.R. 1043 (1933); 85 A.L.R. 97 (1933). 
Some courts disallow compensation where the injury occurs on the premises, although 
at a remote place. Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N.W. 243 (1914). Tennessee dis-
tinguishes between the employer's "property" and his "premises." Bennett v. Vanderbilt 
University, (Tenn. 1955) 277 S.W. (2d) 386. 
20 Haller v. Lansing, note 2 supra; Monahan v. Hoage, note 3 supra; Kubera's Case, 
note 6 supra. 7 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, perm. ed., §1634 (1950); 38 CORN. 
L. Q. 470 (1953); 6 A.L.R. 1151 (1920); 141 A.L.R. 862 (1942). This rule applies only 
where the employee has a fixed place of employment, and does not include truck drivers, 
traveling salesmen, etc. 
21 Beaudry v. Watkins, 191 Mich. 445, 158 N.W. 16 (1916); Anderson v. Kroger 
Grocery 8c Baking Co., 326 Mich. 429, 40 N.W. (2d) 209 (1949). 
22 Jamison v. State Temporary Commission on Agriculture, 308 N.Y. 683, 124 N.E. 
(2d) 321 (1954). 
23 Schank v. Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Co., 147 Neb. 385, 23 N.W. (2d) 557 (1946). 
If an employee is in a place not permitted by the employer he is not in the course of his 
employment. See note 3 supra. 
24 Hallett's Case, 232 Mass. 49, 121 N.E. 503 (1919); Sundine's Case, note 6 supra; 
Kantor v. William Armstrong Publishing Co., 236 App. Div. 749, 258 N.Y.S. 488 (1932); 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 91 Ga. App. 305, 85 S.E. (2d) 484 (1954). This is true even 
if the premises are used by the public, too. Manville v. Department of Labor, 294 N.Y. I, 
59 N.E. (2d) 780 (1944). 
25This involves application of the "coming and going" rule. Generally, an injury 
to an employee going to or from work is not compensable unless the injury occurs on the 
employer's premises a reasonable time before or after working time. See Western Coal 
8c Mining Co. V. Industrial Commission, 296 Ill. 408, 129 N.E. 779 (1921); 7 SCHNEIDER, 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, perm. ed., §1629 (1950). 
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be presumed to be in the course of his employment.26 It is hoped that this 
amendment will be construed to include not only persons going to or from 
work, but also employees injured on their employer's premises during rest 
periods. 
Hazen v. Hatch, S.Ed. 
26 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Supp. 1955) §412.1. This statute was not applied in the 
principal case because the injury occurred in 1951, but on the theory of Rockledge v. 
Garwood, 340 Mich. 444, 65 N.W. (2d) 785 (1954), tµe statute might have been given 
retroactive effect. The amendment is remedial, and merely restores a remedy recognized 
in Michigan as late as 1948 that an injury on the employer's premises was compensable 
even though the conduct had but an indirect connection with the employment. Haggar 
v. Tanis, 320 Mich. 295, 30 N.W. (2d) 876 (1948). See also Brink v. J. W. Wells Lumber 
Co., 229 Mich. 35, 201 N.W. 222 (1924), subsequently overruled by Weaver v. General 
Motors Corp., 330 Mich. 404, 47 N.W. (2d) 665 (1951). 
